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Abstract
Categories and forms of contempt of court are not closed, whereby, 
judges have the discretion to use this power when they deem 
appropriate. However, there are a number of traditional categories 
that have been created and used by the courts in Malaysia and the 
United Kingdom. Contempt in the face of the court record has not 
been a traditional category of contempt in either country, and, thus 
far, has only been recognised in Malaysia in one case. The aims of 
this paper are to consider what the scope of contempt in the face of 
the court record is, when it should apply and whether this category 
is clearly distinct from the other existing categories of contempt of 
court. It is suggested that it may not have been necessary to create the 
category of contempt in the face of the court record as there appears 
to be an overlap between this category and the other categories of 
contempt of court.
Keywords: contempt of court, contempt in the face of the court 
record.
Introduction
Moskovitz1 wrote, “contempt of Court is the Proteus of the Legal 
World, assuming an almost infi nite diversity of forms”. While 
contempt of court may be diffi cult to defi ne as the courts are given 
the discretion to apply this power when the court deems fi t, there 
are still some traditional categories of contempt of court including 
disobeying a court order, scandalising the court, sub judice, 
contempt in the face of the court and interfering with the work of 
court offi cers. Contempt of court in Malaysia stems from the United 
Kingdom. Steve Shim CJ of the Federal Court in Zainur bin Zakaria 
v. Public Prosecutor2acknowledged this link by stating, “now, 
1 Moskovitz, Joseph, ‘Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal’ (1943) 43 
Columbia Law Review 780, at page 780.
2 [2001] 3 MLJ 604, at page 609.
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this peculiar English concept [contempt of court] is applicable in 
Malaysian law …”. The traditional categories above are recognised 
both in Malaysia and the United Kingdom.
The categories of contempt of court have not been authoritatively 
defi ned by statute. As such, it is left to the courts to clarify these 
categories. The traditional categories of contempt of court listed 
above have been recognised in a number of Malaysian cases 
by courts, including superior courts. For example disobeying a 
court order has been recognised by the High Court,3the Court of 
Appeal,4the Supreme Court5 and the Federal Court;6 scandalising 
the court has been considered by the High Court,7 Court of Appeal8 
and Supreme Court;9sub judice has been recognised by the High 
Court;10 the Court of Appeal11 and Federal Court;12 contempt in the 
face of the court has been recognised by the High Court,13 the Court 
of Appeal,14the Supreme Court,15 the Federal Court;16 and interfering 
3 Such as in Kamawang Enterprise Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Mascom (M) Sdn. 
Bhd. & Anor. [2009] 10 CLJ 180 and Fortune Pacifi c Engineering Co. Ltd. v. 
Gajatakraw Industries Sdn. Bhd. [2010] 5 CLJ 590.
4 Such as in John Kee v. Yap Leong Swee (1954) SNBBSCR 57 and Hardial 
Singh Sekhon v. PP [2009] 5 CLJ 101.
5 Such as in Wee Choo Keong v. MBf Holdings Bhd. & Anor. and Another Appeal 
[1993] 2 MLJ 217.
6 Such as in T.O. Thomas v. Asia Fishing Industry Pte. Ltd. [1977] 1 MLJ 151 and 
Chai Tze Foh & Anor. v. Asia Fishing Industry Pte. Ltd. [1993] 2 MLJ 217.
7 Such as in Public Prosecutor v. S.R.N. Palaniappan & 2 Others (1949) 15 MLJ 
246 and Karam Singh Veriah v. Karpal Singh [1988] 2 MLJ 603.
8 Such as in Murray Hiebert v. Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321.
9 Such as inAttorney-General v. Arthur Lee Meng Kuang [1987] 1 MLJ 206 and 
Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi (Penang) Registered & Ors v. S.M. 
Idris & Anor and Another Application[1990] 1 MLJ 273.
10 Such as in Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Samad bin Ahmad & Anor. (1953) 19 
MLJ 118 and Attorney-General v. D. Aloysius Stephens and Another (1957) 
SNBBSCR 58.
11 Such as in Lo Kwock Chuen v. Attorney-General (1959) SNBBSCR 112.
12 Such as in Loot Ting Yee v. Tan Sri Shiekh Hussain bin Sheikh Mohamed & Ors. 
[1982] 1 MLJ 142.
13 Such as in Public Prosecutor v. Lee Ah Keh & Ors. [1968] 1 MLJ 22 and 
Matthias Chang Wen Chieh v. American Express (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.[2010] 6 
CLJ 707.
14 Such as in Woodsville Sdn. Bhd. v. Tien Ik Enterprises Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. [2009] 
3 MLJ 191.
15 Such as in In Re Puteh [1910] 11 SSLR 78 and Public Prosecutor v. Seeralan 
[1985] 2 MLJ 30.
16 Such as in Jaginder Singh & Ors. v. Attorney-General[1983] 1 MLJ 71 and 
Zainur bin Zakaria v. Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 604.
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with the work of court offi cers by the High Court17 and the Supreme 
Court.18These traditional categories are also recognised by cases in 
the United Kingdom collated by authors in textbooks. This extends 
to disobedience of court orders,19 scandalising the court,20 sub 
judice,21 contempt in the face of the court22 and interference with 
persons offi cially connected with the court.23While the courts may 
not be limited to these categories, there is some consistency in the 
recognition of these traditional categories. This article intends to 
focus on ‘contempt in the face of the court record’ and consider 
17 Such as in Dato’ Abdullah Hishan bin Hj Mohd Hashim v. Sharma Kumari 
Shukla[2000] 7 MLJ 667 and Chow Sooi Cheng v. Trans-Global Agencies Bhd. 
& Ors. [2003] 6 CLJ 369.
18 Such as in Tai Kwong Goldsmiths & Jewellers (under receivership) v. Yap Kooi 
Hee & Ors.[1995] 1 MLJ 1.
19 C. J. Miller, ‘Contempt of Court’, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2000, at 
page xxii; Lord Mackay of Clashfern, ‘Contempt of Court’, Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 9(1), 1998, at page 239; Nigel 
Lowe and Brenda Sufrin, The Law of Contempt, Butterworths, 3rd ed., 1996, 
at page xi; Sir David Eady and A.T.H. Smith, Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Con-
tempt, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., 1999, at pages xxxii-xxxiii prefer to classify 
civil contempt as breaches of court orders generally and Mareva Injunctions 
and Anton Piller Orders separately.
20 C. J. Miller, ‘Contempt of Court’, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2000, at 
page xxi; Lord Mackay of Clashfern, ‘Contempt of Court’, Halsbury’s Laws 
of England, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 9(1), 1998, at page 239; 
Nigel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin, The Law of Contempt, Butterworths, 3rd ed., 
1996, at page x and Sir David Eady and A.T.H. Smith, Arlidge, Eady & Smith 
on Contempt, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., 1999, at page xx.
21 C. J. Miller, ‘Contempt of Court’, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2000, at 
pages xviii-xix; Lord Mackay of Clashfern, ‘Contempt of Court’, Halsbury’s 
Laws of England, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 9(1), 1998, at page 
239; Nigel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin, The Law of Contempt, Butterworths, 3rd 
ed., 1996, at page x and Sir David Eady and A.T.H. Smith, Arlidge, Eady & 
Smith on Contempt, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., 1999, at page xix.
22 C. J. Miller, ‘Contempt of Court’, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2000, at 
page xv; Sir David Eady and A.T.H. Smith, Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Con-
tempt, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., 1999, at pages xxvi-xxviii, Nigel Lowe and 
Brenda Sufrin, The Law of Contempt, Butterworths, 3rd ed., 1996, at page ix 
and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, ‘Contempt of Court’, Halsbury’s Laws of Eng-
land, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 9(1), 1998, at page 239.
23 C. J. Miller, ‘Contempt of Court’, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2000, at 
page xxi; Lord Mackay of Clashfern, ‘Contempt of Court’, Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 9(1), 1998, at page 239, Nigel 
Lowe and Brenda Sufrin, The Law of Contempt, Butterworths, 3rd ed., 1996, 
at pages x-xi and Sir David Eady and A.T.H. Smith, Arlidge, Eady & Smith on 
Contempt, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., 1999, at pages xxx-xxxi.
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how this category fi ts with the other existing categories of contempt 
of court.
Existing Categories of Contempt of Court
Categories of contempt of court have been defi ned and refi ned by 
many judges in many cases. It is not attempted here to present a 
comprehensive review of all these explanations, but rather a sample 
of some of them to give an indication of what these categories are 
intended to encompass and how they differ from each other. The 
categories discussed below are those that have been recognised by 
the Malaysian courts.
The fi rst category of contempt of court is disobeying a court order. 
Azahar Mohamed J. of the High Court in MediaCorp News Pte. Ltd. 
& Ors. v. MediaBanc (Johor Bahru) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. (Lim Leong 
Wuoh & Ors., proposed contempt parties)24 explained that contempt 
of court by disobeying a court order involves proving that “ …the 
proposed contempt parties had wilfully, deliberately disobeying, or 
disregarding the order of the court”. A properly instituted court must 
have issued a court order, which an alleged contemnor does not obey. 
Low Hop Bing J. commented in Arab-Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn. 
Bhd. v. Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering J.V. Sdn. Bhd. & Ors.25 
that public policy and public interest demand the law of contempt of 
court in order to ensure, for example, that court orders are fulfi lled 
and the ‘due administration of justice is not put in jeopardy’.
The next category relates to evading service of a court order. Chong 
Siew Fai C.J. (Sabah and Sarawak)26explained in Wee Choo Keong 
v. MBf Holdings Bhd. & Anor. and Another Appeal27that, “deliberate 
or intentional evasion of service of an injunction order of court 
thereby constituting an interference with the administration of 
justice is a contempt of court, and is punishable not for the purpose 
of vindicating the dignity of the court, but to prevent the improper 
24 [2010] 5 MLJ 562, at page 564.
25 [2000] 2 CLJ 632, at page 641.
26 A dissenting judgment in the case, though the majority still recognised this 
category of contempt.
27 [1995] 3 MLJ 549, at page 563.
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interference”.28 Again, a court must have issued a court order, which 
is then intentionally avoided by evading service thereof.
The following category is breaching an undertaking. Abdul Malik 
bin Ishak J. of the High Court in Md Amin bin Md Yusof & Anor. 
v. Cityvilla Sdn. Bhd.29observed that an undertaking to the court 
in the course of proceedings should not be treated lightly. Such an 
undertaking is often equated with an injunction, and, hence, it may 
be enforced by committal. This category requires an undertaking 
to be given to the court by the alleged contemnor, which is then 
breached.
The following category is scandalising the court. The Supreme Court 
in Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi (Penang) Registered & 
Ors v. S.M. Idris & Anor and Another Application30 noted that, “the 
blatant insinuations made by them had scandalized the Supreme 
Court and brought it into disrepute as they were not within limits of 
reasonable courtesy and good faith”. What is required is unwarranted 
and discourteous criticisms of the legal system, which ‘tended to 
prejudice’ the administration of justice.31
Another category is sub judice. The Federal Court in Loot Ting Yee v. 
Tan Sri Shiekh Hussain bin Sheikh Mohamed & Ors.32 clarifi ed that, 
“we feel that the real question for the court in this case is to decide 
whether there is contempt, is whether the risk of prejudice to a fair 
and proper trial of the pending legal proceedings is serious or real or 
substantial”. This category involves commenting on pending legal 
proceedings, which tends to prejudice a fair and proper trial of these 
proceedings.
28 The Supreme Court of India in The Aligarg Municipality Board and Others v. 
Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and Others A.I.R. (1970) S.C. 1767, at page 1770, 
similarly observed, “Contempt proceeding against a person who has failed to 
comply with the Court’s order serves a dual purpose: (1) vindication of the pub-
lic interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel 
the contemnor to do what the law requires of him. The sentence imposed should 
effectuate both these purposes”.
29 [2004] 4 AMR 449, at page 46.
30 [1990] 1 MLJ 273, at page 277.
31 Judge of the Court of Appeal, Ahmad Fairuz and Judge of the Court of Appeal, 
Denis Ong in Murray Hiebert v. Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321, at pages 
332-336 and 359, respectively.
32 [1982] 1 MLJ 142, at page 147.
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The next category is contempt in the face of the court. Zulkefl i J. 
of the High Court in Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd v. Lim 
Joo Thong33opined that contempt in the face of the court related to 
contempt in the court’s cognisance. This category is quite diverse. 
It was added that there is no ‘rigid formula’ on what constitutes this 
category of contempt, although it should involve words or actions 
that tend to interfere with the course of justice. It was also pointed 
out that, “ …it appears unnecessary that the act of contempt should 
take place wholly, or in part in a court room itself nor does it seem 
to be necessary that all the circumstances of the contempt should 
be within the personal knowledge of the judicial offi cer dealing 
with the contempt”. This category seems to traditionally arise when 
contempt of court is committed in a court’s presence, but is not 
limited to this geographical context.
The next category is interference with the work of court offi cers. V.C. 
George J. of the Supreme Court observed in Tai Kwong Goldsmiths 
& Jewellers (under receivership) v. Yap Kooi Hee & Ors.34that, “it 
is trite that a court-appointed receiver is an offi cer of the court and 
accordingly, any interference with him or with property under his 
control constitutes a contempt of court”. It was added that as a general 
principle, “ …interference with persons having duties to perform in 
or at the instance of a court of justice amounts to contempt of court”. 
This category appears to stem from interfering with the work of any 
court appointed offi cer.
These categories appear to be too narrow to include the form of 
contempt that arose in the case below since another category of 
contempt was created and expressly distinguished from contempt in 
the face of the court. It will be discussed further below whether this 
category of contempt was necessary and distinctive, not just from 
contempt in the face of the court, but also compared to the other 
categories of contempt of court. The case below seems to mark the 
rise of a new category of contempt of court.
The Emergence of Contempt in the Face of the Court Record
In Anthony Ratos s/o Domingos Ratos v. City Specialist Centre Sdn. 
Bhd. (t/a City Medical Centre) (Attorney General, Intervener),35 a 
33 [1999] 6 MLJ 38, at pages 54-55.
34 [1995] 1 MLJ 1.
35 [1996] 3 MLJ 349, at page 356.
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l awyer and his client were alleged to be in contempt of court for 
initiating committal proceedings against the Honourable R.K. 
Nathan J.C. who had given an order to strike out the client’s petition 
in Dr. Leela Ratos & Ors. v. Anthony Ratos s/o Domingo Ratos 
& Ors.36 K.L. Rekhraj J.C. of the High Court considered whether 
a lawyer and his client should be found guilty and sentenced for 
contempt of court. Counsel for the client questioned the jurisdiction 
of the court to hear these charges as the court can only take action 
on its own motion where the act of contempt was committed in the 
face of the court. The court overruled the objection and responded 
that it had the power to act on its own motion as these contempt 
proceedings arose out of the collateral contempt proceedings against 
R.K. Nathan J.C. in the earlier case. K.L. Rekhraj J.C. responded that 
“…these contempt proceedings arose out of the collateral contempt 
proceedings which were before this court in committing the judicial 
commissioner for contempt and are therefore proceedings arising 
out of the same cause. Therefore, the act complained of is an act in 
the face of the court record.”37
The court explained that it had the power to act on its own motion 
under Order 52, rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 against 
a person guilty of contempt of court and Order 52, rule 1(3) of these 
Rules empowered a High Court judge to issue an order of committal 
“…in connection with any proceedings in the High Court…”. The 
court therefore held that it has the power to punish on its own motion, 
contempt “…in the face of the court (ex facie) or otherwise…”.38On 
the facts, the court imposed a fi ne of RM10,000 or imprisonment 
for three months in default of payment of the fi ne for each of the 
contemnors,39 but warned that for future cases where the contempt 
was ‘grave’, as here, a custodial sentence would be imposed. The 
court was moved by the intervention of the Attorney General to 
show mercy in this case.40
Considering the Scope of this New Category of Contempt
It is submitted that the court’s interpretation of the Rules above 
validly empowers the court to act on its own motion where any 
36 [1996] 3 MLJ 167.
37 [1996] 3 MLJ 349, at page 356.
38 Ibid.
39 [1996] 3 MLJ 349, at page 360.
40 Ibid.
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form of contempt of court is allegedly committed in relation to 
proceedings before the High Court. Order 52, rules 1(3) and 4 are not 
limited to contempt in the face of the court. The former rule permits 
contempt proceedings in ‘connection’ to any proceedings before the 
High Court and the latter rule recognises the High Court’s power to 
initiate contempt proceedings on its own motion. Order 1, rule 2(1) 
provides that these Rules apply to all proceedings in the High Court. 
Therefore, for these Rules to be applied, the proceedings must be 
in ‘connection’ to proceedings before the High Court. Additionally, 
for contempt proceedings to be initiated before the High Court, it is 
likely that the contempt arose in connection to proceedings before 
this court.
What is then not very clear is what is meant by this new category 
of contempt in the face of the court record. If this category was 
meant to be different from contempt in the face of the court, then 
does this new category encompass all other forms of contempt, as 
long as it does not occur in the face of the court, such as disobeying 
a court order granted by the High Court, scandalising the High 
Court or High Court judge and sub judice in relation to pending 
High Court proceedings? If contempt in the face of the court record 
only means that the contempt must have occurred in ‘connection’ 
with proceedings before the High Court, this could overlap with 
disobeying a court order, scandalising the court and sub judice.
The court imposed quite a high fi ne in this case and even then, K.L. 
Rekhraj J.C. stated he was being lenient. It would then be important 
to clarify the form of contempt committed. Were the contemnors in 
contempt for alleging that R.K. Nathan J.C. committed contempt 
of court by striking out the client’s petition in Dr. Leela Ratos & 
Ors. v. Anthony Ratos s/o Domingo Ratos & Ors.? If so, what form 
of contempt was involved here? If the contemnors made unfairly 
critical remarks about R.K. Nathan J.C.’s decision, this may be 
scandalising the court. K.L. Rekhraj J.C. explained the form of 
contempt in this case in the following terms:
This court had looked at this contempt by Mr Murthi41 
and his client to cite a judicial commissioner as an act 
of deliberate and contumelious conduct suffi cient to 
warrant a serious penalty of imprisonment to vindicate 
41 The lawyer who was alleged to have committed contempt of court in this case.
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its own dignity, to enforce obedience to its mandates 
and to protect its offi cers and to shield those who are 
entrusted to its care from such scurrilous attacks; for 
without such deterrent punishment or the protection 
of the law, the court of justice would sooner or later 
loose its hold of the public respect; and with it the 
maintenance of law and order would be rendered 
impossible. …drew his ‘sword’ and charged himself 
into the arena of court to challenge the authority of 
the judge by taking the contempt proceedings against 
him42 to commit him to prison. His drawn sword was 
met by a ‘shield’ –the provisions of s 14 of the Courts 
of Judicature Act43–and the sword of punishment ….44
Section 14 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 relates to judicial 
immunity for civil suits and costs, but does not specifi cally include 
liability for contempt of court. This extension of privilege was not 
explored by the court. Additionally, this section does not appear to 
warrant a fi nding of contempt for raising contempt against a judge. 
It was also not further clarifi ed whether raising contempt against 
a judge in the performance of his judicial duties would expose the 
applicant to contempt liability in every case or because of distinctive 
features in this case, such as the application being ‘deliberate’. An 
application to cite a judge for contempt of court would probably be 
‘deliberate’ in most cases. It was not clarifi ed why this application 
was ‘contumelious’; was it such because the application was brought 
or perhaps disrespectful phrasing of the application? There were no 
cases cited as authorities in the judgment to help relate these fi ndings 
to other forms and cases concerning contempt of court.
The category of contempt in the face of the court record, as explained 
in this case, appears to cover any form of contempt not committed in 
the presence of the court. This may clarify how the alleged contempt 
42 R.K. Nathan J.C.
43 Section 14(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 provides that, “No judge 
or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for 
any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, 
whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction, nor shall any order for costs 
be made against him, provided that he at the time believed himself to have ju-
risdiction to do or order the act complained of”.
44 [1996] 3 MLJ 349, at page 357.
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came to the court’s notice, but does not seem to clarify what was the 
form of the misconduct alleged. Thus, the form of contempt within 
this category still appears to be uncertain.
Recommendations
This new category appears to have been referred to in response to 
the preliminary objection that a court can only initiate contempt 
proceedings on its own motion for contempt in the face of the court. 
It is suggested that the court fairly pointed out that this objection is 
not valid based on the relevant Rules of the High Court 1980. 
It is submitted that to interpret this category so broadly as to 
encompass any contempt proceedings arising in connection to other 
legal proceedings before the court is unnecessarily confusing as 
it would seem to include all other categories (disobeying a court 
order, evading service of a court order, breaching an undertaking, 
scandalising the court, sub judice and interfering with the work of 
court offi cers), merely to distinguish these categories from contempt 
in the face of the court. Court proceedings would be necessary 
to issue the court order, require the undertaking, giving rise to 
scandalous or sub judice comments and involving the work of court 
offi cers, hence, potentially, all of these categories could be included 
in contempt in the face of the court record with this interpretation.
It is suggested that it would be clearer to have more specifi c categories 
of contempt to more clearly distinguish the forms of contempt 
of court involved rather than including most of these categories 
within a substantially broader category. Additionally, as pointed out 
earlier,45 even contempt in the face of the court, has been extended to 
contempt not necessarily committed in the court’s presence, and so, 
may arise in connection with court proceedings. As such, even this 
category may overlap with contempt in the face of the court record 
if this latter category merely needs to arise in connection with other 
court proceedings.
The contempt of court that arose in the case of Anthony Ratos 
appears to be where the client and lawyer initiated proceedings for 
striking out the client’s petition. It is not clear how far advanced 
45 Zulkefl i J. of the High Court in Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd v. Lim 
Joo Thong [1999] 6 MLJ 38, at pages 54-55.
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the lawyer and client had taken their contempt proceedings against 
the judge. However, since they were stated to have arisen from “…
the collateral contempt proceedings which were before this court…
”,46 these contempt proceedings were already initiated. Since the 
proceedings were already before the court in this case, at least where 
the application to cite the judge for contempt was already made, it 
is submitted that the judge hearing this contempt application could 
proceed to punish the contemnors for contempt in the face of the court.
Contempt in the face of the court can arise where the court is 
insulted. Abdoolcader J. of the High Court in Re Kumaraendran, An 
Advocate & Solicitor47commented, “…insulting and contumacious 
behaviour in outrageous and provocative language tantamount to 
a deliberate challenge to the authority of a learned president and 
clearly a gross contempt in the face of the court”. To fall within this 
form of contempt, it would have been clearer to point to specifi c 
words or phrases in the application to cite the judge for contempt 
that were found to be discourteous and disrespectful. If there were no 
such phrases,  and, instead, objection taken to where parties attempt 
to cite judges for contempt for discharging their lawful duties, this 
could have been explained to constitute contempt in itself.
It is argued that merely applying for judges to be cited for contempt 
should not constitute contempt of court itself as long as the written 
and/or applications and submissions are expressed with due courtesy 
and respect. Such an application can be dismissed if not valid, but 
as long as courteously made, perhaps the court should discuss 
the merits of the application rather than just dismissing it without 
hearing, especially since the judicial immunity in section 14 of the 
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 does not seem to extend to allegations 
of contempt of court.
If the client’s application to cite the judge for contempt was submitted, 
but not yet before the court to be argued further and the court felt 
that it were important to hold this application as contempt of court, 
46 K.L. Rekhraj J.C. of the High Court in Anthony Ratos s/o Domingos Ratos v. 
City Specialist Centre Sdn. Bhd. (t/a City Medical Centre) (Attorney General, 
Intervener) [1996] 3 MLJ 349, at page 356.
47 [1975] 2 MLJ 45, at page 47. This case was cited by the Federal Court in 
Jaginder Singh & Ors. v. Attorney-General [1983] 1 MLJ 71, at page 74 and 
the Supreme Court in Public Prosecutor v. Seeralan [1985] 2 MLJ 30, at page 33.
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any discourteous or disrespectful words in the application could 
be held as contempt by scandalising the court or even sub judice 
contempt if the words tended to prejudice the fair trial of any further 
pending proceedings. A judge is also a court offi cer, so alleging 
contempt of a judge could even be interpreted as interfering with the 
work of court offi cers if the allegation had the effect of interfering 
with the work of the judge in any way. There did not appear to be 
any court order which was disobeying or evading service thereof, 
or any undertaking that was breached to justify these categories of 
contempt being involved.
It does not appear to be very clear from the report of this case what 
form of contempt was involved and at what stage the contempt 
application was made against the judge that gave rise to contempt 
proceedings against the applicant and his lawyer. However, it 
is submitted that it may not have been necessary to create a new 
category of contempt that does not appear to be distinctly different 
from contempt in the face of the court, or any of the other categories 
of contempt. Arguably, the facts of this case could have also fallen 
within the existing categories of contempt.
Conclusion
K.L. Rekhraj J.C. of the High Court appeared to create a new genus 
of contempt of court known as ‘contempt in the face of the court 
record’. The court did not seem to give any authority for this particular 
term. In addition, this term does not seem familiar in contempt of 
court in the United Kingdom48 or even India.49 Additionally, thus 
48  As per Nigel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin, The Law of Contempt, Butterworths, 3rd 
ed., 1996; Lord Mackay of Clashfern, ‘Contempt of Court’, Halsbury’s Laws 
of England, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 9(1), 1998; Sir David Eady 
and A.T.H. Smith, Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd 
ed., 1999 and C. J. Miller, Contempt of Court, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2000.
49 As per Bal Raj Varma, Law of Contempt in India, Bombay: N.M. Tripathi 
Private Limited, 1974; Justice S.R. Roy, The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, 
Calcutta: Kamal Law House, 1996; Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer & R.P. Srivastava, 
K.J. Aiyar’s Law of Contempt of Courts, Legislatures and Public Servants, 
Allahabad: The Law Book Company (P) Ltd., 9th ed., 1997; P.S. Narayana, 
Law of Contempt, Hydrebad: Asia Law House, New Edition, 1998; Justice S.K. 
Mookerji, Iyer’s Law of Contempt of Courts with Parliament, State Assemblies 
& Public Servants, 2nd ed., Delhi Law House, 1999; Samaraditya Pal, The Law 
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far, this category has not yet been adopted or applied in any other 
reported Malaysian case since.
This new category may have been created to clarify that the court 
may initiate contempt proceedings in cases other than contempt in 
the face of the court. However, this point could have been made 
without this new category being created, as the new category, 
without further clarifi cation of its scope, raises further questions of 
how and when it was intended to apply.
This was obviously a serious form of contempt as indicated by the 
severity of the fi ne imposed. This case raised intriguing points, 
which, unfortunately, were not fully explained in the report of the 
case. Raising the new and unusual category of contempt seems to 
have also raised more questions than answers concerning the scope 
and intended application of this new category. This may explain why 
this new category has not since been applied in any other reported 
case in Malaysia. It is not a typical category of contempt of court in 
Malaysia or the United Kingdom, and thus, remains an anomaly in 
the law on contempt of court in Malaysia.
It is acknowledged that judges have and would need the discretion to 
create new categories of contempt of court when the need arises in 
dealing with the multitude of cases and factual variations confronting 
them. However, it is submitted that when a new category of contempt 
of court is created, particularly one that is lacking in precedent, such 
category should be clearly explained in terms of how does it differ 
from existing categories, why it is necessary to punish such a form 
of contempt and when should such a category be used in future 
cases. This is important to help clarify how this category is intended 
to apply for the courts to uphold justice in this and future cases.
